University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Court Review: The Journal of the American
Judges Association

American Judges Association

May 2005

Court Review: Volume 24, Issue 1 - Recent Criminal Decisions of
the United States Supreme Court: The 2004-2005 Term
Charles H. Whitebread
Yale Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

Whitebread, Charles H., "Court Review: Volume 24, Issue 1 - Recent Criminal Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court: The 2004-2005 Term" (2005). Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges
Association. 44.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/44

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2004-2005 Term
Charles Whitebread

T

he 2004-2005 Term of the Supreme Court off e red no
blockbuster rulings. Nonetheless, in what turned out to
be the final year for the Rehnquist Court, there were ru lings of note on topics ranging from securities fraud to sentencing guidelines. In one case, the Court looked to foreign law as
a model for determining whether to prohibit the death penalty
as a sentence for juvenile criminal offenders. It will be interesting to see, with changes in the Court ’s membership, whether
this trend to look toward foreign law in constitutional or other
criminal cases continues. In this article, I will review the
Court’s criminal-law decisions from the past term. In the next
issue of C o u rt Review, I will review the Court ’s civil decisions.
FOURTH AMENDMENT

In Devenpeck v. Alford,1 Justice Scalia, writing for all the justices except Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no part in the
decision, held that there is no additional limitation on the
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement that the
offense giving rise to probable cause be “closely related” to the
offense to which the officer refers at the time of arrest. Using
wig-wag headlights, respondent stopped to assist a disabled
vehicle, and left quickly as a Washington state patroller pulled
up. When questioned, the occupants of the disabled vehicle
informed the patrolman that they thought respondent was a
police officer. The patrolman pursued respondent and was
later joined by his supervisor. The patrolmen discovered wigwag lights on respondent’s car, that he was listening to a Kitsap
County Sheriff’s Office on a special radio, and that he had
handcuffs and a hand-held police scanner in his car. The
patrolmen also noticed that respondent was recording the conversation. They arrested respondent for violation of the
Washington Privacy Act despite respondent’s claim that he
could by law record his conversation with the officers.
The patrolmen, after speaking with a state prosecutor,
charged respondent with violating the Act and issued a ticket
to respondent for his flashing lights. Under the law, “respondent could be detained on the latter offense only for the period
of time ‘reasonably necessary’ to issue a citation.” The state
trial court dismissed both charges and respondent then filed a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 “and a state cause
of action for unlawful arrest and imprisonment, both claims
resting upon the allegation that petitioners arrested him without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” A divided panel for the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit determined that the patrolmen “could not

Footnotes
1. 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
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have had probable cause to arrest because they cited only the
Privacy Act charge” and tape recording the conversation was
not a crime. It rejected petitioner’s claim that probable cause
existed because respondent was impersonating a police officer
or obstructing law enforcement on the grounds that “those
offenses were not ‘closely related’ to the offense invoked by
Devenpeck as he took respondent into custody.”
The Court began its opinion by reciting the basic principles
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: “The Fourth
Amendment protects ‘the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’” A warrantless arrest is considered reasonable if “there is probable cause to believe that a criminal
offense has been or is being committed.” Probable cause is
measured by “the reasonable conclusion[s] . . . drawn from the
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” The
Court has made clear in prior decisions that “an arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” It has repeatedly
explained that “the fact that the officer does not have the state
of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide
the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate
the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” The Court concluded “the rule that
the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’
to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by
the arresting officer at the time of arrest is inconsistent with
this precedent.” This rule “makes the lawfulness of an arrest
turn upon the motivation of the arresting officer—eliminating,
as validating probable cause, facts that played no part in the
officer’s expressed subjective reason for making the arrest.”
Otherwise, the constitutionality of the arrest will “vary from
place to place and from time to time.” An arrest by a “veteran
officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in
precisely the same circumstances would not.”
Justice Stevens, writing for a 6-2 Court, held in Illinois v.
Caballes2 that a dog sniff during a routine traffic stop does not
violate the Fourth Amendment because it does not prolong the
stop, and does not implicate any legitimate privacy interest a
driver carrying contraband may have. Chief Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the decision.
Respondent was stopped by an Illinois state trooper for
traveling at 71 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone. While the first state
trooper was in the process of issuing a warning ticket, a second
trooper arrived and walked his narcotics-detection dog around

2. 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005).

respondent’s car even though the first trooper had not reported
suspicion of drugs. The dog alerted the troopers and marijuana
was discovered in the trunk of respondent’s car. The entire
episode took less than ten minutes. Respondent was arrested
and convicted of a narcotics offense after the trial judge denied
his motion to suppress the marijuana. The appellate court
affirmed, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that “because the canine sniff was performed without any ‘specific and articulable facts’ to suggest drug activity, the use of
the dog ‘unjustifiably enlarge[ed] the scope of a routine traffic
stop into a drug investigation.’”
The Supreme Court reversed and based its opinion on the
following assumptions: (1) respondent was stopped solely for
a traffic violation and there was no suspicion that he possessed
marijuana; (2) the traffic stop, or initial seizure of respondent,
was based on probable cause and legitimate; and (3) even
though the initial stop was legitimate, the stop “can violate the
Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably
infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” The Court
also recognized the legitimacy of a prior Illinois Supreme
Court ruling that a search would be illegal where a routine traffic stop was prolonged beyond a reasonable time because of a
dog sniff. However, it finds that the stop in this case did not
exceed ten minutes, a time “justified by the traffic offense and
the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” The Court indicated that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision was erroneous
in this case because it determined that the state trooper unconstitutionally turned a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed
any drugs. The Fourth Amendment, however, is violated only
when a search compromises a legitimate privacy interest. The
Court has previously determined that an individual does not
have any legitimate privacy interest in possessing contraband.
In keeping with this reasoning, the Court held in United States
v. Place,3 that “a ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog” is “sui generis,” in a class all itself because it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item.” The Court concluded that a narcotics-detection dog that
only reveals the existence of contraband, and “‘does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view,’ during a lawful traffic stop, generally does
not implicate legitimate privacy interests.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
in Muehler v. Mena,4 which held that the use of handcuffs to
detain an individual during the execution of a search warrant
for weapons and gang-affiliation paraphernalia is not an unreasonable use of force. No justices dissented, but Justice Stevens
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
During an investigation into a gang-related drive-by shooting, police obtained a search warrant. They used a Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team for the search because they
believed there was a “high degree of risk involved in searching
a house” given the gang affiliations. While the police executed
the warrant, respondent, among others, was placed and

remained in handcuffs at
The Fourth
gunpoint in a converted
Amendment . . .
garage during the entire
search. The police had also
is violated only
informed the Immigration
when a search
and Naturalization Service
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a
(INS), and during the search,
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occupant of the house for
interest.
their name, date and place of
birth, and immigration status.
The search yielded various weapons, some marijuana, and
gang paraphernalia.
Respondent filed an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
against the officers, claiming that “she was detained ‘for an
unreasonable time and in an unreasonable manner’ in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.” A jury determined that the officers
had violated Mena’s Fourth Amendment right “by detaining
her both with force greater than that which was reasonable and
for a longer period than that which was reasonable.” The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment on two grounds: (1) that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because “it was
objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted
garage and keep her in handcuffs during the [entire] search”;
and (2) the questioning of Mena regarding her immigration
status was a separate Fourth Amendment violation. The
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court began by citing to Michigan v. Summers,5 in
which it held “that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority ‘to detain the occupants of the
premises while a proper search is conducted.’” The Court
found these detentions “appropriate . . . because the character
of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and
because the justifications for detention are substantial.”
Applying Summers to this scenario, the Court concluded that
Mena’s detention for the duration of the search was “plainly
permissible.” The Court stated that “[i]nherent in Summers’
authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched
is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.” The Court recognized that the use of handcuffs was
more of an intrusion than was recognized in Summers, but
believed that it was justified as “this was no ordinary search”
but an “inherently dangerous situation[,]” since the police
were searching for weapons and believed that gang members
were present on the property. The Court further concluded
that the amount of time Mena was in handcuffs was not unreasonable given the danger of the search.
Finally, the Court also believed Mena’s rights were not violated by the INS agent’s questioning while she was detained.
The Court disagreed with the lower court’s premise that the
police “were required to have independent reasonable suspicion in order to question Mena concerning her immigration
status because the questioning constituted a discrete Fourth
Amendment event.” It stated: “We have ‘held repeatedly that

3. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
4. 125 S.Ct. 1465 (2005).

5. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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[A] trial court’s midtrial dismissal of a
charge . . . for lack
of evidence is final
and cannot be
reconsidered unless
there is a law in
place that allows for
such reconsideration.

mere police questioning
does not constitute a
seizure.’”
FIFTH AMENDMENT

A 5-4 Court, in Smith v.
Massachusetts,6 held that
under
the
Double
J e o p a rdy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, a trial
c o u rt ’s midtrial dismissal
of a charge against a
defendant for lack of evidence is final and cannot be re c o n s i d e red unless there is a law
in place that allows for such reconsideration. Petitioner
Melvin Smith was tried before a jury on three counts. At the
conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the court, on a motion
filed by petitioner, dismissed the third count on the gro u n d s
that “there was ‘not a scintilla of evidence’” to prove one element of the crime. After the close of defendant’s case but prior
to closing argument, the prosecution asked the judge to
reevaluate her decision dismissing the third count on the
grounds that a prior Massachusetts court decision had held
that the evidence he presented was sufficient. The judge
a g reed and reversed her decision. Petitioner was convicted on
all three counts.
Under the common law, “double jeopardy . . . applied only
to charges on which a jury had rendered a verdict.” However,
the Court has long since held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
“prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the
same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury
verdict.” The Court has recognized only a “single exception to
the principle that acquittal by judge precludes reexamination
of guilt no less than acquittal by jury.” This exception occurs
when “a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial judge (or an
appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment
of acquittal.” In that case, the prosecution can appeal to reinstate the jury verdict. However, “if the prosecution has not yet
obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are
impermissible.”
The Court believed that when the judge in this case dismissed the third count, the judge’s dismissal of the count was
in fact “a judgment of acquittal,” since no jury verdict had
been returned and further “factfinding proceedings going to
guilt or innocence” were prohibited. The Court rejected the
prosecution’s argument that double jeopardy did not attach
because the court’s decision was “purely a legal determination”
and that the “factfinding function” was reserved to the jury.
The Court previously rejected similar reasoning in United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.7 In Martin Linen, the Court
determined that an acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 29 “is a substantive determination that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden[]” and thus, “even when the
jury is the primary factfinder, the trial judge still resolves ele-

6. 125 S.Ct. 1129 (2005).
7. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
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ments of the offense in granting a Rule 29 motion in the
absence of a jury verdict.”
The Court next addressed “whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause permitted [the judge] to reconsider that acquittal once
petitioner and his codefendant had rested their cases.” The
Court stated “that the facts of this case gave petitioner no reason to doubt the finality of the state court’s ruling.” The Court
recognized that “as a general matter state law may prescribe
that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the
State’s proof can be reconsidered.” However, it found no such
law in Massachusetts. The Court determined that “[i]t may
suffice for an appellate court to announce the state-law rule
that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal occurred at a stage in the trial where the
defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not possibly
have caused him prejudice.” That was not the case here, however, because “the possibility of prejudice” arose. The defendant could have presented evidence to rebut the element, but
he ran the risk of bolstering the prosecution’s case.
A 7-2 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer, determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the
use of visible shackles during the penalty phase of a capital
murder trial unless the use is justified by an essential state
interest. The petitioner in Deck v. Missouri8 was tried and convicted in state court for robbing and killing an elderly couple.
He was sentenced to death but the Missouri Supreme Court set
aside the sentence. During the new sentencing proceeding,
“Deck was shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly
chain.” His numerous objections to the shackles were overruled and the jury was aware that Deck was shackled during
the entire proceeding. Deck was again sentenced to death and
appealed again, claiming “that his shackling violated both
Missouri law and the Federal Constitution.” The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.
Under common law, “[t]he law has long forbidden routine
use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State
to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of special
need.” The Court stated that more recently, it “has suggested
that a version of this rule forms part of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ due process guarantee.” The Court
took this opportunity to state with certainty that this rule identifies “a basic element of the ‘due process of law’ protected by
the Federal Constitution.” The Court recognized, however,
that the penalty phase of a trial might dictate a different rule
because “the reasons that motivate the guilt-phase constitutional rule . . . [may not] apply with similar force in this context.” The Court recognized “[j]udicial hostility to shackling
may once primarily have reflected concern for the suffering—
the ‘tortures’ and ‘torments’—that ‘very painful’ chains could
cause.” More recently, the Court has “emphasized the importance of giving effect to three fundamental legal principles”:
(1) the presumption of innocence; (2) the right to counsel and
a meaningful defense; and (3) the maintenance of a dignified
judicial process sought by judges.

8. 125 S.Ct. 2007 (2005).

The Court reasoned that the “considerations that militate
against the routine use of visible shackles during the guilt
phase of a criminal trial apply with like force to penalty proceedings in capital cases.” While the innocence phase of the
trial is concluded, and therefore the use of shackles has no
bearing on this consideration, “shackles at the penalty phase
threaten related concerns.” The jury is “deciding between life
and death,” which is a decision that has the same “severity”
and “finality” as guilt. According to the Court, a defendant in
shackles conveys to the jury “that court authorities consider
the offender a danger to the community[,]” and “inevitably
affects adversely the jury’s perception of the character of the
defendant.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT: COUNSEL

In Florida v. Nixon,9 the Court held that conceding guilt
during the first phase of a capital trial is not tantamount to
entering a guilty plea on behalf of the accused; therefore, counsel’s failure to obtain defendant’s express consent to such a
strategy does not automatically render counsel’s performance
deficient. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which all the justices joined, except Chief Justice Rehnquist
who took no part in the decision of the case.
Respondent Joe Elton Nixon was indicted for the brutal
murder of Jeanne Bickner. Assistant Public Defender Michael
Corin was assigned to Nixon and filed a plea of not guilty.
Corin deposed all the State’s witnesses and determined that
“Nixon’s guilt was not ‘subject to any reasonable dispute.’”
Corin commenced plea negotiations, which were unsuccessful,
and then decided to focus on the penalty phase of the trial,
“believing that the only way to save Nixon’s life would be to
present extensive mitigation evidence centering on Nixon’s
mental instability.” As an experienced attorney, Corin believed
that contesting Nixon’s guilt in the first phase of the trial
would compromise his ability to persuade the jury that Nixon’s
actions were a product of the mental illness. Corin attempted
to explain the situation to Nixon on three occasions. Nixon
generally was unresponsive and never approved or protested
the attorney’s strategy. In fact, Nixon showed little interest in
the trial and “intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to
be present at trial.” During the trial, Corin admitted Nixon’s
guilt and asked the jury to focus on the penalty phase of the
trial. He only questioned the State’s witnesses to the extent he
wanted to clarify their statements but did not present a
defense. During the penalty phase, Corin argued that Nixon
was mentally ill. The jury, however, recommended that Nixon
be given the death penalty.
After a direct appeal, Nixon sought state postconviction
relief arguing that Corin provided ineffective assistance of
counsel because he conceded “Nixon’s guilt without obtaining
Nixon’s express consent.” Relying on United States v. Cronic,10
Nixon argued that Corin’s actions were “presumed prejudicial
because it left the prosecution’s case unexposed to ‘meaningful
adversarial testing.’” The Court did not agree. It recognized the

9. 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
10.466 U.S. 648 (1984).

basic principle that “[a]n
[T]he “considerations
attorney . . . has a duty to
consult with the client that militate against
regarding ‘important decithe routine use of
sions,’ including questions
visible shackles
of overarching defense
during the guilt
strategy.” However, this
obligation
“does
not
phase . . . apply
require counsel to obtain
with like force to
the defendant’s consent to
‘every tactical decision.’” penalty proceedings
in capital cases.”
Some decisions that affect
basic rights cannot be
waived through a surrogate; for instance, the basic right to a
trial. By pleading guilty, “a defendant waives constitutional
rights that inhere in a criminal trial, including the right to trial
by jury, the protection against self-incrimination, and the right
to confront one’s accusers.” Therefore, while it may be tactically advantageous, an attorney may not make a guilty plea on
behalf of a client, and “a defendant’s tacit acquiescence in the
decision to plead is insufficient to render the plea valid.”
The Court determined that Corin’s concession of guilt was
not a “guilty plea” and did not “waive” Nixon’s rights in a
criminal trial. Therefore, Corin did not need explicit approval.
The Court rested its decision on the following facts. First, the
prosecution was still required to prove its case. Second, Corin
still could cross-examine witnesses and move to exclude prejudicial evidence, which he did. The Court also noted that, as
required, Corin did attempt to discuss his strategy with Nixon
on several occasions. The Court concluded “[g]iven Nixon’s
constant resistance to answering inquiries put to him by counsel and court . . . Corin was not additionally required to gain
express consent before conceding Nixon’s guilt.” According to
the Court, Corin fulfilled his duties. The Court recognized that
in a more standard trial, the decision might be closer. However,
in a death penalty case, counsel faces very different decisions,
“not least because the defendant’s guilt is often clear.” The
Court deemed it reasonable for counsel, therefore, “to focus on
the trial’s penalty phase, at which time counsel’s mission is to
persuade the trier that his client’s life should be spared.” When
defendant is “unresponsive” to counsel’s strategic discussions,
“counsel’s strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule
demanding the defendant’s explicit consent.”
A 5-4 Court, in Rompilla v. Beard,11 held that counsel provided ineffective assistance when it failed to review the files the
prosecutor stated it would use as evidence to prove aggravating factors in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, despite the
fact that defendant and his family indicated that no mitigating
evidence existed. Justice Souter wrote the opinion of the
Court, while Justice Kennedy dissented.
Petitioner Ronald Rompilla was found guilty of murder. In
the penalty phase of the proceedings, “the prosecutor sought
to prove three aggravating factors to justify a death sentence.”
Prior to trial, the prosecutor indicated that he would use the

11.125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005).
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files from Rompilla’s prior
convictions as evidence.
Despite that warning,
defense counsel did not
obtain a copy of the files
and, instead, merely questioned Rompilla and his
family about possible mitigating evidence. Rompilla
and his family members
indicated that there was
none. In reality, if defense
counsel had looked at the
file “they would have found
a range of mitigation leads
that no other source had
opened up.” The file included records of Rompilla’s childhood
and mental-health history, including test results that pointed to
schizophrenia and other disorders. The defense’s mitigating
evidence merely consisted of relatively brief testimony of
Rompilla’s family members, who argued in effect for residual
doubt and beseeched the jury for mercy, and three mentalhealth officials, who were consulted prior to trial. Rompilla
was sentenced to death.
After denial of relief in his state postconviction proceedings,
Rompilla sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District
Court, applying the necessary standard under 28 U.S.C. section 2255, determined “that the State Supreme Court had
unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington12 as to the
penalty phase of the trial, and granted relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” A divided panel for the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court recognized that the standard of reasonableness in this scenario has “few hard-edged rules, and the
merits of a number of counsel’s choices in this case are subject
to fair debate.” While the Court recognized that defense counsel need not “scour the globe on the off-chance something will
turn up,” it also believed that there are certain lines of inquiry
which must be followed. It believed it is “clear and dispositive”
that counsel was “deficient in failing to examine the court file
on Rompilla’s prior conviction.” The Court gave the “obvious
reason” as “[c]ounsel knew that the Commonwealth intended
to seek the death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant
history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.” It is clear from the record that counsel did not review
the transcripts from Rompilla’s prior convictions and that failure to examine them seriously compromised the opportunity
to respond to a case for aggravation.
The Court believed that it did not, as the dissent argued,
create a “‘rigid, per se’ rule that requires defense counsel to do
a complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced.” It only requires counsel “to make reasonable efforts to
review the prior conviction file” if it knows that the prosecution intends to introduce it and will quote damaging testimony
from the victim. The Court stated: “Other situations, where a

defense lawyer is not charged with knowledge that the prosecutor intends to use a prior conviction in this way, might well
warrant a different assessment.” The Court also concluded,
examining the matter de novo, that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial in this instance under the standard that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”
In Halbert v. Michigan,13 the Court considered the constitutionality of Michigan’s amendment to its Constitution: “In
every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right
. . . to have an appeal as a matter of right, except as provided
by law an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court.” Under this amendment,
“[a] defendant convicted by plea who seeks review in the
Michigan Court of Appeals must now file an application for
leave to appeal.” Further, a defendant who pleads guilty or
nolo contendere is not entitled to court-appointed appellate
counsel except by leave of court, grant of application for leave
to appeal, or in certain specific instances. Petitioner pleaded
nolo contendere to two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The day after he was sentenced, “Halbert submitted a handwritten motion to withdraw his plea.” The court
denied it stating “that Halbert’s ‘proper remedy is to appeal to
the Michigan Court of Appeals.’” Petitioner requested the aid
of counsel twice but the requests were denied. Petitioner then
filed a pro se application for leave to appeal, claiming a sentencing error and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court
of Appeals denied the application “for lack of merit in the
grounds presented.” The Michigan Supreme Court, in a
divided panel, “denied Halbert’s application for leave to appeal
to that court.”
A 6-3 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held
that an indigent defendant who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere is entitled to the appointment of appellate counsel
when seeking access to a direct appeal. “The Federal
Constitution imposes on the States no obligation to provide
appellate review of criminal convictions.” However, once the
State has provided such an avenue it “may not ‘bolt the door to
equal justice’ to indigent defendants.” The Court believed this
case must be aligned with one of its two prior cases: Douglas v.
California14 or Ross v. Moffitt.15 In D o u g l a s, the Court held that
“in first appeals as of right, States must appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants.” In R o s s, the Court held “a State
need not appoint counsel to aid a poor person in discre t i o n a ry
appeals to the State’s highest court, or in petitioning for review
in this Court.” The Supreme Court stated that two considerations were key to its holding in D o u g l a s , which did not exist in
R o s s: (1) “such an appeal entails an adjudication on the ‘merits’”; and (2) “first-tier review differs from subsequent appellate
stages ‘at which the claims have once been presented by [appellate counsel] and passed upon by an appellate court.’” As to the
latter consideration, in second-tier discre t i o n a ry appeals:
[A] defendant who had already benefited from counsel’s aid in a first-tier appeal as of right would have, “at

12.466 U.S. 668 (1984).
13.125 S.Ct. 2582 (2005).

14.372 U.S. 353 (1963).
15.417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals
setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an
opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case.”

In United States v. Booker,16 the Court held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the jury requirement of
the Sixth Amendment. The Court also invalidated the provisions of the Guidelines that make them mandatory (18 U.S.C.
section 3553(b)(1)), and the accompanying appellate review
standard (18 U.S.C. section 3742(e)), stating that instead
courts should treat them as advisory. Justice Stevens delivered
the opinion of the Court as to the first holding and Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion as to the second. Based on the
Court’s prior decision in Blakely v. Washington,17 the lower
courts, in the companion cases of United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan, rejected application of the Guidelines
“because the proposed sentences were based on additional facts
that the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge sentenced respondent Booker to 30 years,
instead of the 21 years and 10 months that it could have sentenced Booker, solely based on the findings by the jury. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed based on the
Court’s decision in Blakely. With regard to respondent Fanfan,
the trial judge determined at a sentencing hearing that additional facts existed that authorized a sentence of 188 to 235
months. However, based on the Court’s decision in Blakely, the
trial judge sentenced Fanfan solely on the facts reflected in the

jury verdict. The Government
The Court . . .
appealed.
invalidated the
The Court began its opinion by restating the following
provisions of the
basic principles: (1) “the
Guidelines that
Constitution protects every
make them
criminal defendant ‘against
conviction except upon proof
mandatory and
beyond a reasonable doubt of the accompanying
every fact necessary to constiappellate review
tute a crime with which he is
standard . . . .
charged’”; and (2) a defendant has a “right to demand
that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime.” In
Apprendi v. New Jersey,18 the Court held “[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
Court’s opinion was reaffirmed in Ring v. Arizona,19 where it
held that it was “impermissible for ‘the trial judge, sitting
alone’ to determine the presence or absence of the aggravating
factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death
penalty.” And most recently, the Court, in Blakely, held that a
trial judge could not increase a sentence beyond the statutory
“standard” based on his finding of “deliberate cruelty,” even if
Washington law authorized the increased sentence for that
type of felony and the time to which the defendant was sentenced was still below the statutory “maximum.” The Court
determined that the “statutory maximum” for the purposes of
Apprendi is the maximum the judge can impose “solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” According to the Court, the Guidelines, by their
own terms, are mandatory and “impose binding requirements
on all sentencing judges.” It concluded, therefore, that it runs
afoul of the Sixth Amendment since many of the factors that
mandate an increased sentence are not determined by the jury.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court found that there
are provisions within the Guidelines that make them “mandatory” and, therefore, incompatible with the Court’s holding
today. The Court believed, however, that instead of reading a
jury requirement into the Guidelines, it should instead strike
the provisions of the Guidelines making them mandatory (18
U.S.C. sections 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)), leaving the
Guidelines “effectively advisory.” The Court supported its
decision by looking at the legislative history and concluded
that if its constitutional holding was “added onto the
Sentencing Act as currently written, the requirement would so
transform the scheme that Congress created that Congress
likely would not have intended the Act as so modified to
stand.” Second, the Court recognized that “Congress’ basic
statutory goal—a system that diminishes sentencing disparity—depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine
. . .the real conduct that underlies the crime of conviction.”
According to the Court, it appeared that Congress would have
intended that this system continue and to allow the jury a role
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In the end, the Court believed “that Douglas provide[d] the
controlling instruction” because of “[t]wo aspects of the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ process following plea-based convictions”: (1) “in determining how to dispose of an application
for leave to appeal, Michigan’s intermediate appellate court
looks to the merits of the claims made in the application”; and
(2) “indigent defendants pursuing first-tier review in the Court
of Appeals are generally ill equipped to represent themselves.”
The Court believed “[o]f critical importance” is the fact that
“the tribunal to which he addresses his application, the
Michigan Court of Appeals” sits to correct errors in individual
cases. The court of appeals can respond to an application in
various ways, “[b]ut the court’s response to the leave application by any of the specified alternatives—including denial of
leave—necessarily entails some evaluation of the merits of the
applicant’s claims.” The Court also focused on Halbert’s specific
situation to support its conclusion. The Court believed that
“[n]avigating the appellate process without a lawyer’s assistance is a perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond
the competence of individuals, like Halbert, who have little
education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments.” The
Court recognized Michigan’s legitimate interest in “reducing
the workload of its judiciary,” but believed providing “counsel
will yield applications [for leave to appeal] easier to comprehend.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT: JURY TRIAL
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in this “system” would
“ d e s t roy” Congre s s ’s intent.
Finally, the Court stated that if
the Guidelines were read to
include the Sixth Amendment
requirement, it “would create
a system far more complex
than Congress would have
intended.”
Justices Stevens, Scalia,
and Thomas agreed that the
Guidelines are subject to the
Sixth Amendment, but disagreed with the Court’s decision to excise only portions of
the Guidelines and make
them discretionary. Justice Stevens would “simply allow the
Government to continue doing what is has done since this
Court handed down Blakely—prove any fact that is required to
increase a defendant’s sentence . . . to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Justice Scalia believed that the Court essentially
has created a scheme that existed prior to the Guidelines enactment. He criticized the Court, however, for establishing an
“unreasonableness” standard for appellate re v i e w. Justice
Thomas agreed with Justice Stevens’ “proposed remedy and
much of his analysis,” but wrote separately because he disagreed with “[Justice Stevens’] restatement of the severability
principles and reliance on legislative history.”
Justice Breyer dissented from part of the Court’s opinion. He
wrote: “I find nothing in the Sixth Amendment that forbids a
sentencing judge to determine (as judges at sentencing have
traditionally determined) the manner or way in which the
offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted.” He
distinguished “sentencing facts” from facts that prove the “element of the crime” and believed that history does not “support
a ‘right to jury trial’” for the former.
In Johnson v. California,20 a second case this term concerning Batson v. Kentucky,21 an 8-1 Court invalidated a California
law requiring a defendant to make a prima facie showing that
it was “more likely than not” the prosecutor used discriminatory reasons to exercise a peremptory challenge, finding that
this test does not fall within the framework set forth in Batson.
Petitioner Jay Shawn Johnson, a black male, was convicted of
second-degree murder and assault resulting in death. The prosecutor used three of his twelve preemptory challenges to
remove all the remaining black prospective jurors, leaving a
jury that was entirely white. Petitioner objected twice during
the process, but both objections were overruled by the trial
court without asking the prosecutor to offer a reason. Instead,
the trial judge found that “petitioner had failed to establish a
prima facie case under the governing state precedent.”
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court determined that California’s test, as set forth in Wheeler, does not fit
within the framework of Batson. The Court enumerated three
steps in Batson “which together guide trial courts’ constitu-

tional review of peremptory strikes”: (1) “the defendant must
make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose’”; (2) once a prima facie showing is made, the State must
“‘explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes”; and (3) finally,
“‘ the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of
the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’” In this
case, the question is “whether Batson permits California to
require at step one that ‘the objector must show that it is more
likely than not the other party’s peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias.’”
The Court began with Batson and concluded that Batson
itself does not support California’s rule. In Batson, the Court
held “that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out
by offering a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the
proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’” The Court stated that “in describing the burden-shifting framework, we assumed in Batson that the trial judge
would have the benefit of all relevant circumstances . . . before
deciding whether it was more likely than not that the challenge
was improperly motivated.” The Court:
did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a
defendant would have to persuade the judge—on the
basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for
the defendant to know with certainty—that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.

20.125 S.Ct. 2410 (2005).
21.476 U.S. 79 (1986).

22.125 S.Ct. 2398 (2005).

[A] prosecutor’s
inconsistent
arguments at a
co-defendant’s trial
about who was
the triggerman . . .
did not render a
defendant’s guilty
plea unknowing,
involuntary, or
unintelligent.
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The first step of Batson only requires a defendant to produce
“sufficient” evidence “to permit the trial judge to draw an
inference that discrimination has occurred.”
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, argued that in Batson,
the Court said that states “have flexibility in formulating
appropriate procedures to comply.” He criticized the Court for
now telling “California how to comply with ‘the prima facie
inquiry mandated by Batson.’”
In an opinion written by Justice O’Connor, a unanimous
Court held in Bradshaw v. Stumpf22 that a prosecutor’s inconsistent arguments at a co-defendant’s trial about who was the trigg e rman in an aggravated murder charge did not render a defendant’s guilty plea unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. As
part of a plea agreement for respondent’s participation in the
robbery, murder, and attempted murder of a husband and wife,
respondent agreed to plead guilty to aggravated murder and
attempted aggravated murd e r. The State, in re t u rn, agreed to
drop most of the other charges. With respect to the aggravated
murder charge, respondent agreed to plead guilty to “one of the
three capital specifications, with the State dropping the other
two.” This meant that respondent was still eligible for the death
penalty. At the penalty hearing, respondent’s primary argument,
however, “was that he had participated in the plot only at the
urging and under the influence of Wesley [his co-conspirator],
that it was Wesley who had fired the fatal shots . . . and that
Stumpf’s assertedly minor role in the murder counseled against

the death sentence.” The State argued that Stumpf was the principal offender and he was sentenced to death.
At Wesley’s trial, the prosecutor introduced the testimony of
Wesley’s cellmate, who testified that Wesley had admitted to
firing the shots that killed Mary Jane Stout. Wesley took the
stand in his own defense and “testified that Stumpf had shot
Mrs. Stout.” Wesley was sentenced “to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole after 20 years.” After Wesley’s trial,
“Stumpf, whose direct appeal was still pending in the Ohio
Court of Appeals, returned to the Court of Common Pleas with
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate his death sentence.” He argued that the prosecutor’s argument and evidence
that Wesley shot Mrs. Stout “cast doubt on Stumpf’s conviction
and sentence.” The prosecutor claimed that the cellmate’s testimony “was belied by certain other evidence (ballistics evidence and Wesley’s testimony in his own defense) confirming
Stumpf to have been the primary shooter.” These arguments
were in direct conflict with his arguments at Wesley’s trial.
After Stumpf exhausted his state remedies, he filed a federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising the same claim.
The Sixth Circuit reversed on two grounds: (1) “Stumpf’s
guilty plea was invalid because it had not been entered knowingly and intelligently” because “Stumpf had pleaded guilty to
aggravated murder without understanding that specific intent
to cause death was a necessary element of the charge under
Ohio law”; and (2) “Stumpf’s due process rights were violated
by the state’s deliberate action in securing convictions of both
Stumpf and Wesley for the same crime, using inconsistent theories.”
The Court disagreed. Precedent has established that “[a]
guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid
only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” However, the record reflects that Stumpf’s attorneys “represented . . . that they had explained to their client
the elements of the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself
then confirmed that this representation was true.” The Court
has never held that the trial court must explain the elements
on the record. The Court also rejected Stumpf’s arguments that
it was clear he did not understand the specific intent element
of the crime because he maintained throughout “his denial of
having shot the victim.” Ohio law does not require that Stumpf
himself shoot Mrs. Stout because “aiders and abettors [are]
equally in violation of the aggravated murder statute, so long
as the aiding and abetting is done with the specific intent to
cause death.” According to the Court, “Stumpf has never provided an explanation of how the prosecution’s post-plea use of
inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea.” The Court did recognize that “[t]he prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent
theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence
. . . for it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion about Stumpf’s principal role in the offense was material to its sentencing determination.” However, it is not clear if

the lower court “would
have concluded that
Stumpf was entitled to
resentencing had the
court not also considered
the conviction invalid.”
T h e re f o re, the Court
expressed no opinion as
to this matter and
remanded the case.
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EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In a 5-4 opinion . . .
the Court held that
the Eighth and
Fourteenth
Amendments forbid
the death penalty
for offenders who
were under . . . 18
when they committed
the crime.

In a 5-4 opinion in
Roper v. Simmons,23 the
Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of
18 when they committed the crime. Justice Kennedy delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
Respondent Christopher Simmons committed murder at
the age of 17, and was tried after he had turned 18. There “is
little doubt” that Simmons committed the murder. He was
tried as an adult because he was 17 and outside the criminal
jurisdiction of Missouri’s juvenile court system. During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the jury was instructed they
could use age as a mitigating factor to the death penalty.
However, Simmons was sentenced to death. After this case had
run its course in the state court system, the Court decided
Atkins v. Virginia,24 which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of mentally disabled persons. Simmons then filed a new petition for state postconviction relief, “arguing that the reasoning of Atkins established
that the Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who
was under 18 when the crime was committed.” The Missouri
Supreme Court agreed and set aside Simmons’ death sentence.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
To reach its decision, the Court followed a line of its precedent. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,25 a plurality of the Court
determined that “our standards of decency do not permit the
execution of any offender under the age of 16 at the time of the
crime.” The plurality stressed that “the reasons why juveniles
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibility of an
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” The following year,
in Stanford v. Kentucky,26 the Court “concluded the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments did not proscribe the execution of
juvenile offenders over 15 but under 18.” The Court believed
that ‘there was no national consensus ‘sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.’” That same day, the
Court also decided Penry v. Lynaugh,27 and held that there was
no “categorical exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded.” Three years ago, the Court reconsidered its
Penry decision in Atkins. It held that “standards of decency
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have evolved . . . and now
demonstrate that the execution of the mentally
retarded is cruel and
unusual punishment.” The
Atkins Court “returned to
the rule, established in
decisions
pre d a t i n g
Stanford,
that
‘the
Constitution contemplates that in the end . . . [the Court’s]
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.’” In this case, the Court reconsidered the decision in Stanford and wrote that to do so it will apply the following factors: (1) state consensus and practice and (2) its
own independent judgment.
The Court stated that the evidence of the “national consensus” for the death penalty for juveniles is similar to that for
mentally disabled. Essentially, its prohibition among the States
is increasing and its use is decreasing. The Court concluded
that the majority of States have prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty for juveniles under the age of 18, “and . . .
now holds this is required by the Eighth Amendment.” There
are “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18
and adults . . .[that] demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders”:
(1) there is “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility.”; (2) juveniles are more susceptible to “negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”; and
(3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of
an adult.” These differences “render suspect any conclusion
that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders.” The Court
also stated that “[o]nce the diminished culpability of juveniles
is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications
for the death penalty [retribution and deterrence] apply to
them with lesser force than to adults.” The Court did not overlook “the brutal crimes too many juvenile offenders have committed[,]” and recognized that in some cases a juvenile might
have sufficient psychological maturity to merit the sentence of
death. However, the Court believed that “a line must be
drawn” somewhere.
In the last part of its opinion, the Court reinforced its decision based upon its views and its “task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment.” Citing numerous facts, the Court concluded “that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.” The Court believed it “proper that we acknowledge
the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the
juvenile death penalty.”
Justices O’Connor and Scalia wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice O’Connor found no evidence of a “national consensus”
to categorically exclude the execution of individuals under the
age of 18, “no matter how deliberate, wanton, or cruel the
offense.” Justice Scalia wrote separately about “the mockery”
today’s decision has on the traditional role of the judiciary by

“announcing the Court’s conclusion that the meaning of our
Constitution has changed over the past 15 years.” He also criticized the Court for proclaiming “itself sole arbiter of our
Nation’s moral standards.” Finally, in reference to the Court’s
reliance on international law, he wrote, “Though the views of
our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center stage.”
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Justice Scalia . . .
criticized the Court
for proclaiming
“itself sole arbiter of
our Nation’s moral
standards . . . .”
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of a 5-3 Court in
Johnson v. California,28 in which the Court held that the proper
s t a n d a rd of review for the California Department of
Correction’s (CDC) policy separating new or newly transferred
inmates by race is strict scrutiny. The CDC houses all new
inmates and inmates transferred from other state facilities in
“reception centers” for up to 60 days. Double-cell assignments
in the reception centers are predominantly based on race. The
CDC justifies its actions on the grounds “that it is necessary to
prevent violence caused by racial gangs.” The rest of the facility’s areas are fully integrated. Petitioner Garrison Johnson is
an African-American inmate who has been incarcerated since
1987 and has been in many prison facilities. Each time he is
transferred, he is held at a reception center and double-celled
with another African-American. He filed a pro se complaint in
the district court “alleging that the CDC’s reception-center
housing policy violated his right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment by assigning him cellmates on the
basis of race.”
The Court began its analysis with its holding in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,29 in which it held that “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Under this standard,
“the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests.’” The purpose behind this policy is
that “[r]acial classifications raise special fears that they are
motivated by an invidious purpose.” The CDC argued “that its
policy should be exempt . . . because it is ‘neutral’—that is, it
‘neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more
than any other group or individual.’” The Court stated that it
rejected a similar argument—that separate could be equal—in
Brown v. Board of Education.30 It refused to change its opinion
today.
The Court believed the need for strict scrutiny is as important here as in its other cases despite the argument that the policy is necessary to control racial violence: “racial classifications
‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.’” The Court
stated that “[v]irtually all other States and the Federal
Government manage their prison systems without reliance on
racial segregation.” The CDC has not made it clear why it, like
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, cannot address prison security
issues on individual bases. The Court continued by stating that
“[i]n the prison context, when the government’s power is at its

apex, we think that searching judicial review of racial classifications is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination.”
The Court rejected the CDC’s argument that “[d]eference to
the particular expertise of prison officials in the difficult task
of managing daily prison operations’ requires a more relaxed
standard of review.” It hasn’t seen the need in other circumstances and won’t here. The Court concluded its opinion by
stating that its decision does not necessarily preclude a policy
that is based on race, rejecting the argument that “[s]trict
scrutiny is . . . ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Prison officials still have the opportunity to show a compelling interest
and a narrowly tailored policy to reach that end. It remanded
the case for a determination of whether the CDC policy survives strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a unanimous
Court in Wilkinson v. Austin,31 which held that the procedures
set forth in Ohio’s New Policy are sufficient to protect an
inmate’s procedural due-process rights when he is being considered for placement in Ohio’s Supermax security prison
(OSP). Supermax prisons are the highest security prisons. In
OSP, inmates are confined for 23 hours a day, their cells are lit
at all times though sometimes dimmed, there is no contact
between inmates in different cells, and meals are solitary.
According to the Court, “[i]t is fair to say OSP inmates are
deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and
of almost all human contact.” The New Policy was implemented in 2002 to provide “more guidance . . . [and] more procedural protection against erroneous placement in OSP.” The
procedures are summarized as follows: (1) a prison official
completes a three-page form called a “Security Designation
Long Form”; (2) “[a] three-member Classification Committee
(Committee) convenes to review the proposed classification
and to hold a hearing”; (3) at least 48 hours prior to the hearing, the inmate is provided with written notice detailing the
charges and can also request a copy of the Long Form; and (4)
the inmate may attend the hearing and defend himself or provide a written statement but cannot call witnesses. If the committee determines that the inmate should not be put in OSP,
the inquiry ends. If it decides otherwise, it documents its decision and sends the report to the warden of the prison in which
the inmate is being held. If the warden disagrees with the classification, the matter is ended. If he agrees, “he indicates his
approval” and forwards the annotated report to the Bureau of
Classification (Bureau). The inmate also receives a copy and
has 15 days to file his objection with the Bureau. The Bureau
reviews the report and makes a final determination. If it agrees
with the recommendation, the inmate is transferred and the
report is annotated again with the Bureau’s reasons. The inmate
receives another automatic review of his file by an OSP staff
member within 30 days of his transfer. His file is reviewed
yearly.
Prior to the implementation of the New Policy, a group of
OSP inmates brought suit against various prison officials under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging “that Ohio’s Old Policy . . .
violated due process. . . . On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated

its New Policy.” Both the
The Supreme Court
district court and the court
agreed with the
of appeals “evaluated the
adequacy of the New
lower courts that
Policy.” The district court
inmates have a
issued a detailed remedial
liberty
interest in
order based on its determination that “the inmates avoiding assignment
have a liberty interest in to [Ohio’s supermax
avoiding assignment to
security prison].
OSP.” The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circ u i t
affirmed this finding and the district court’s “procedural modifications” of the New Policy. However, “it set aside the
[d]istrict [c]ourt’s far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they exceeded the scope of the [court’s] authority.”
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that
inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property.”
A “liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself . . . or
it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state
laws or policies.” The Court has already held that “the
Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in
avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.”
However, the Court has also held that this liberty interest “may
arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner.”32 In Sandin, the
Court “abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of
particular regulations[]” to identify state-created liberty interests and returned to the “real concerns undergirding the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.” Thus, “the touchstone
of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created
liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of the regulations regarding those
conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” The Court
has not, and stated that it will not, identify “the baseline from
which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison’s system[]” because it is clear that “under any
plausible baseline[,]” assignment in OSP imposes an atypical
and significant hardship.
The Court next turned to the question of what process then
is due to the inmates to protect their liberty interest. “Because
the requirements of due process are ‘flexible and call for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,’ we
generally have declined to establish rigid rules and instead
have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular pro c e d u res.” The Court re f e rred to Mathews v.
Eldridge,33 where it identified three distinct factors for consideration: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedures safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
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function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The
Court believed that although
inmates have an interest in
avoiding confinement in OSP,
the “procedural protections to
which they are entitled are
more limited than in cases
where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement
at all.” The Court concluded that the procedures in place are
sufficient to protect again erroneous deprivation of the inmates’
liberty interest. Inmates are entitled to “notice of the factual
basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair
opportunity for rebuttal[]” in two instances during the entire
process. Further, if at any point “one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates.”

In a 5-3 decision
. . ., the Court held
that the word
“any” as used in
the statute does
not include foreign
courts.

CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Whitfield v. United States,34 the Court interpreted 18
U.S.C. section 1985(h) of the federal money-laundering
statute, which provides: “Any person who conspires to commit
any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the
commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.” A
unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor,
held that conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under section 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Petitioner and other codefendants were charged under section 1985(h) in connection
with a fraudulent investment scheme. The indictment only
described in “general terms” the “manner and means” used to
accomplish the objects of the conspiracy and “did not charge
the defendants with the commission of any overt act in furtherance thereof.” Petitioners asked the trial court to instruct
the jury that it must find “beyond a reasonable doubt that at
least one of the co-conspirators had committed an overt act in
furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy.” The court
denied the request. Petitioners were found guilty and appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction. It determined that the jury instructions were proper
“because § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act.” The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
Circuits.
According to the Court, the language of the statute shows
that Congress did not intend that proof of an overt act was necessary for a conviction. Its interpretation relied primarily on
United States v. Shabani,35 a case in which it interpreted similar
language in a drug-conspiracy statute. In Shabani, the Court
relied on its previous decisions in Nash v. United States36 and
Stinger v. United States,37 and held the statute did not require
proof of any further act: “where Congress had omitted from the
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relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly requiring
an overt act, the Court would not read such a requirement into
the statute.” Basic principles of statutory interpretation dictate
that “absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt
the common law definition of statutory terms.” The Court has
continually stated that the common-law understanding of conspiracy “does not make the doing of any act other than the act
of conspiring a condition of liability.”
The Court interpreted the use of the word “any” in two different statutes this term. In Small v. United States,38 the Court
interpreted “any” as it is used in the federal unlawful gun-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. section 922 (g)(1). Section 922(g)(1)
makes it “unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted
in any court . . . to . . . possess . . . any firearm.” Petitioner Gary
Small was convicted in a Japanese court for having tried to
smuggle firearms and ammunition into Japan. When Small
returned to the United States, he purchased a firearm. The federal government charged Small for “unlawful gun possession”
under section 922(g)(1). Small pled guilty to the charge but
reserved his right to challenge his conviction based on the fact
that his prior conviction fell outside the scope of the statute
because it was a foreign conviction. The District Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit both
rejected Small’s argument that “any” court did not refer to foreign courts.
In a 5-3 decision, written by Justice Breyer, the Court held
that the word “any” as used in the statute does not include foreign courts. The Court began by stating that “[t]he word ‘any’
considered alone cannot answer this question” because “[i]n
ordinary life, a speaker who says, ‘I’ll see any film,’ may or may
not mean to include films shown in another city.” Similarly,
“[i]n law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase ‘any person’ may or may not mean to include a “persons’ outside ‘the
jurisdiction of the state.’” Instead, the Court must draw the
meaning of “any” from the legislative use of the word. The
Court first recognized that there is a “commonsense notion that
Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”
Therefore, the Court has adopted “the legal presumption that
Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not
extraterritorial, application.” This presumption would result in
prohibiting unlawful gun possession domestically, not internationally. The Court believed a “similar assumption is appropriate when we consider the scope of the phrase ‘convicted in any
court.’”
To support the application of this presumption, the Court
stated that “as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways”: (1) “foreign convictions
. . . may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws
would permit.”; (2) they might “include a conviction from a
legal system that is inconsistent with an American understanding of fairness”; and (3) “they would include a conviction for
conduct that domestic law punishes far less severe l y.”
Therefore, the Court believed that “the key statutory phrase
‘convicted in any court . . .’ somewhat less reliably identifies
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dangerous individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at
issue.” The Court also believed that “it is difficult to read the
statute as asking judges or prosecutors to refine its definitional
distinctions where foreign convictions are at issue.” The
statute does not require courts or prosecutors to “weed out”
inappropriate foreign convictions, nor does the Court believe
courts and prosecutors are capable of doing this. Finally, the
Court concluded the language of the statute “does not suggest
any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.” In fact, the
Court believed that if the statute applied to foreign conviction,
“the statute’s language creates anomalies.” It gave five examples
drawn specifically from the express language of the statute. For
instance, the statute specifically provides an exception if a person has been convicted of federal or state antitrust or regulatory offenses. It does not provide an exception, however, if a
person has been convicted of a foreign antitrust or regulatory
offense.
Justice Thomas, writing a dissenting opinion, conceded that
the phrase “‘any court,’ like all other statutory language, must
be read in context.” However, he does not believe section
922(g)(1) suggests a “geographic limit on the scope of ‘any
court,’” whereas, in contrast, “other parts of the firearms-control law” do. Justice Thomas concluded his dissent by stating:
“The Court never convincingly explains its departure from the
natural meaning of § 922 (g)(1).” He found that instead, the
Court “institutes the troubling rule that ‘any’ does not really
mean ‘any,’ but may mean ‘some subset of “any,”’ even if nothing in the context so indicates.”
In Pasquantino v. United States,39 the Court interpreted the
word “any” as used in the federal wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 1343. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Thomas, the
Court held that a scheme to defraud a foreign government of
tax revenues qualifies as “any scheme” under the federal wirefraud statute. Petitioners were “indicted for and convicted of
federal wire fraud for carrying out a scheme to smuggle large
quantities of liquor into Canada from the United States.”
Petitioners ordered liquor from a discount store over the telephone and drove it into Canada without declaring it. The purpose was to avoid Canadian taxes, which were almost double
the liquor’s purchase price. Prior to trial, petitioners moved to
have the charges against them dropped on the grounds “that it
stated no wire fraud offense.” Section 1343 “prohibits the use
of interstate wires to effect ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, re p resentations, or promises.’” Petitioners
claimed “that the Government lacked sufficient interest in
enforcing the revenue laws of Canada, and therefore that they
had not committed wire fraud.” The district court rejected the
petitioners’ argument and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, on a rehearing en banc, affirmed.
The Court stated that two elements of the crime are in dispute: (1) whether petitioners engaged in any “scheme or artifice to defraud”; and (2) whether “the ‘object of the fraud . . .
be ‘[money or] property’ in the victim’s hands.” In its opinion,
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collection of tax obligations of foreign nations. Petitioners
argued that “to avoid reading § 1343 to derogate from the common-law revenue rule, we should construe the otherwiseapplicable language of the wire fraud statute to except frauds
directed at evading foreign taxes.” The Court wrote that at the
time the wire-fraud statute was enacted, there was no “wellestablished revenue rule principle” at common law. Instead,
courts “treated the common-law revenue rule as a corollary of
the rule that . . . ‘[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another.’” It stated: “The basis for inferring the revenue
rule from the rule against foreign penal enforcement was an
analogy between foreign revenue laws and penal laws.” Various
courts first drew this inference “in a line of cases prohibiting
the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the courts
of another sovereign.”
The Court believed that “[t]he revenue rule’s grounding in
these cases shows that, at its core, it prohibited the collection
of tax obligations of foreign nations.” The Court recognized
that this case is unlike the “classic examples of actions traditionally barred by the revenue rule[]” and believed that the revenue rule jurisprudence is not a clear bar to this prosecution.
The Court stated: “A prohibition on the enforcement of foreign
penal law does not plainly prevent the Government from
enforcing a domestic criminal law.” Further, petitioners did not
cite to any case that “barred an action that had as its primary
object the deterrence and punishment of fraudulent conduct—
a substantial domestic regulatory interest entirely independent
of foreign tax enforcement.” The Court believed that “the wire
fraud statute advances the Federal Government’s independent
interest in punishing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct, a
significant feature absent from all of petitioners’ revenue rule
cases.” The Court recognized that enforcement of the criminal
statute will “in an attenuated sense” enforce the Canadian revenue law. However, the revenue rule has “never proscribed all
enforcement of foreign revenue law.”
In a per curiam opinion, the Court, in Medellin v. Dretke,40
after a proclamation issued by the president that the United
States would “discharge its international obligations” under the
Vienna Convention, dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, stating that petitioner must pursue his rights
via state court. Jose Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national,
“confessed to participating in the gang rape and murder of two
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girls in 1993.” He was convicted and sentenced to
death in a Texas state court.
Medellin filed a state habeas
petition, “claiming for the
first time that Texas failed to
notify him of his right to
consular access as required
by the Vienna Convention.”
The state court rejected this
argument and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. Subsequently, Medellin filed a federal habeas petition.
The District Court denied the petition. While the petition was
pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) “issued its decision in Case
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals . . . in which the
Republic of Mexico had alleged violations of the Vienna
Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican
nationals facing the death penalty in the United States.” The
ICJ “determined that the Vienna Convention guaranteed individually enforceable rights, that the United States had violated
those rights, and that the United States must ‘provide, by means
of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals . . . .’”
The Fifth Circuit “denied Medellin’s application for a certificate
of appealability[,]” based on “its prior holdings that the Vienna
Convention did not create an individually enforceable right.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the writ of certiorari was pending, President George W. Bush “issued a memorandum that stated the United States would discharge its
international obligations under the Avena judgment.” Medellin
relied on this memorandum as “separate bases for relief that
were not available at the time of his first state habeas action . .
. [and filed a] successive state application for a writ of habeas
corpus just four days before oral argument [here].” The Court
stated that “[t]his new development, as well as the factors discussed below, leads us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.”
The Court offered additional reasons for its holding:
First . . . [i]n Reed v. Farley,41 this Court recognized that
a violation of federal statutory rights ranked among the
“nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable
in a postconviction proceeding” unless they meet the
“fundamental defect” test announced in our decision in
Hill v. United States. . . .42 Second, with respect to any
claim the state court “adjudicated on the merits,” habeas
relief in federal court is available only if such adjudication “was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court. . . .” Third, a habeas corpus petitioner
cannot enforce a “new rule” of law. . . . Fourth, Medellin
requires a certificate of appealability in order to pursue
the merits of his claim . . . which may be granted only
where there is “a substantial showing of the denial of a
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constitutional right. . . .” [And] [f]ifth, Medellin can seek
federal habeas relief only on claims that have been
exhausted in state court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court in
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,43 held that “corrupt persuasion,” as used in 18 U.S.C. section 1512(b)(2)(A), requires
consciousness of wrongdoing. This case stemmed from the
Securities Exchange Commission’s investigation of Enron’s
activities during the 1990s and through 2001. At that time,
petitioner Arthur Andersen LLP “audited Enron’s publicly filed
financial statements and provided internal audit and consulting
services.” In August 2001, the SEC opened an informal investigation into Enron’s accounting activities. The SEC did not open
a formal investigation until October 30, 2001, and did not serve
subpoenas on Arthur Anderson until November 9. Until that
time, various meetings were held between the top people at
Arthur Andersen and memoranda were sent among the “Enron
engagement team” urging “everyone to comply with the firm’s
document retention policy[,]” even if it meant destroying
documents that would clearly be relevant to any SEC investigation and any potential litigation. In fact, the document
destruction didn’t stop until November 9, when the head of the
engagement team sent a memorandum to the team stating “No
more shredding . . . . We have been officially served for our documents.” Arthur Andersen then was indicted for corruptly persuading another to withhold documents in the investigation:
In March 2002, petitioner was indicted in the Southern
District of Texas on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. §§
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). These sections make it a crime to
“knowingly use intimidation or physical force, threaten,
or corruptly persuade another person . . . with intent to
. . . cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or
“alter” documents for use in, an “official proceeding.”
The District Court relied on a Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury
Instruction to define “corruptly,” which defined it as “‘knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or
undermine the integrity’ of a proceeding.” However, complying
with the Government’s request, the District Court changed the
word “dishonestly” to “impede.” The jury eventually returned
a guilty verdict and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
In its opinion, the Court focused on “what it means to
‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuade.’” The Court believed that
the word “knowingly” is as important as the word “corruptly”
because the statute “punishes not just ‘corruptly persuading’
another, but ‘knowingly . . . corruptly persuading’ another.”
The Court wrote that “the natural meaning of these terms provides a clear answer[]” to interpretation of the statute: (1)
“‘Knowledge’ and ‘knowingly’ are normally associated with
awareness, understanding, or consciousness”; (2) “‘[c]orrupt’
and ‘corruptly’ are normally associated with wrongful,
immoral, depraved, or evil”; and (3) “[j]oining these meanings
together here makes sense both linguistically and in the statu-
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tory scheme.” The Court concluded that “[o]nly persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly . . . corruptly
persuade.’” The Court believed that “[t]he outer limits of this
element need not be explored here because the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.” As modified, “[n]o longer was any type of
‘dishonesty’ necessary to a finding of guilt, and it was enough
for petitioner to have simply ‘impeded’ the Government’s
factfinding ability.” The instructions were also wrong because
“[t]hey led the jury to believe that it did not have to find any
nexus between the ‘persuasion’ to destroy documents and any
particular proceeding.”
CRIMINAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE

In Bell v. Thompson,44 the Court held that even if Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) authorized a stay of mandate
by the circuit court following the denial of a writ of certiorari
and even if an appellate court could stay the mandate without
entering an order, a delay of five months is an abuse of discretion. In 1985, respondent Gregory Thompson was sentenced to
death for the abduction and murder of a woman. After exhausting his state remedies, Thompson raised a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in a federal habeas petition. He presented
evidence from a psychologist, Dr. Faye Sultan, who examined
him 13 years after the offense and who “contended that
Thompson’s symptoms indicated he was ‘suffering serious
mental illnesses at the time of the 1985 offense.’” The District
Court dismissed the petition. While appeal was pending in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Thompson “filed a
motion in the District Court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) requesting that the court supplement the
record with Sultan’s expert report and deposition[,]” which he
claimed was erroneously omitted. He also filed a motion with
the Sixth Circuit to hold the appeal in abeyance. Both the
District Court and the Sixth Circuit denied his motions. The
Sixth Circuit aff i rmed the dismissal of the petition. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Thompson then filed a
motion with the Sixth Circuit “seeking to extend the stay of
mandate pending disposition of his petition for rehearing.” in
the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion.
The Supreme Court denied rehearing; however, the Sixth
Circuit did not issue its mandate pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Meanwhile, the Tennessee Supreme Court set the execution.
“From Febru a ry to June 2004, there were proceedings in both
state and federal courts related to Thompson’s present competency to be executed.” On June 23, 2004, the Sixth Circuit
“issued an amended opinion in Thompson’s initial federal
habeas case[,]” which vacated the district court ’s dismissal and
“remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s
i n e ffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” The Sixth Circuit
“relied on its equitable powers to supplement the record on
appeal with Dr. Sultan’s 1999 deposition after finding that it was
‘apparently negligently omitted’ and ‘probative of Thompson’s
mental state at the time of the crime.’” The court “explained its
authority to issue an amended opinion five months after this
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Court denied a petition for rehearing: ‘We rely on our inherent
power to reconsider our opinion prior to the issuance of the
mandate, which has not yet issued in this case.’”
A 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,
reversed. According to Rule 41(b), once a petition for writ of
certiorari is denied, “[t]he court of appeals must issue the mandate immediately.” The Court did not answer whether the Rule
“authorizes a stay of the mandate following the denial of certiorari.” with or without an order. Instead it finds that even if it
could issue such a stay, “the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in doing so” by waiting five months. A court speaks
through its judgments and orders. “Without a formal docket
entry neither the parties nor this Court had, or have, any way
to know whether the court had stayed the mandate or simply
made a clerical mistake.” It states that in Calderon v.
Thompson,45 it “held that federalism concerns, arising from the
unique character of federal habeas review of state-court judgments, and the policies embodied in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required an additional presumption against recalling the mandate.” These “finality and
comity concerns” are implicated in this case regardless of
whether “a dedicated judge discovered what he believed to
have been an error.”
Justice Breyer dissented, claiming that this case presented a
set of unusual “circumstances of a kind that I have previously
experienced in the 25 years I have served on the federal bench.”
He focused on the fact that a judge discovered an error and
sought to correct that error because it “could affect the outcome
of what is, and has always been, the major issue in the case.” He
believed it is not an abuse of discretion to “‘correct a decision
that it perceived to have been mistaken.’” He believed this case
presents three questions: (1) a legal question—whether the
court of appeals abused its discretion; (2) an epistemological
question—“[h]ow, in respect to matters involving the legal
impact of the Sultan report and deposition, can the Court
replace the panel’s judgment with its own”[;] and (3) a question
about basic jurisprudence—even though the “legal system is
based on rules; it also seeks justice in the individual case.”
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